In this post, we provide a detailed analysis of an interesting Excel 4.0 XLM macrosheet maldoc distribution campaign that is tied to a variety of executable payloads, a subject matter we'll be covering in a future blog. As of the time of writing, detection rates for this class of attack are relatively low, and these samples happily bypass the internal GSuite and O365 protection mechanisms.
Earlier this year, we here at InQuest launched our new InQuest Labs data portal. Labs is an amazing resource, with a plethora of useful tools and intelligence offerings. Much could be written about the site, and much has been...but not about this part right here: Base64 Regular Expression Generator.
Since YARA rule creation is a highly valuable skill set we approach the lessons slowly, think of "baby steps" from the movie "What About Bob?" as the approach. In keeping the spirit of the process, we feel that the next natural step to take is to learn about the different components that make up the rules and focus on how they are constructed.
In this short post, we share a YARA rule that threat hunters will find valuable for identifying potentially malicious Powershell pivots. Specifically, we'll be looking for base64 encoded Powershell directives. Additionally, some interesting real-world samples will be shared with the reader. Including an SSL certificate, Microsoft Windows shortcut (LNK) file, and a JPG image.
This is the first post in an ongoing series about YARA and its exceptional ability to carve inside of binaries, documents, photos, and other types of files to uncover and match patterns. The additional posts in the series will give anyone who is thinking about gaining YARA skills the ability to start from scratch and get comfortable with the tool's functionality. Each post will advance in skill level and include some of the personal and professional standards we follow to instill good habits early on in the learning process.
In this article, we dissect a sneaky malicious Microsoft Excel XLM file that we caught in the wild. To do so, we utilize a few open source as well as in-house tools to analyze the Excel document. During our analysis, we point out the limitations of a few popular file carving tools, such as foremost and scalpel, in extracting data from this and related samples.
Here at InQuest, YARA is among the many tools we use to perform deep-file inspection, with a fairly extensive rule set. InQuest operates at line speed in very high-traffic networks, so these rules need to be fast. This blog post is the second in a series discussing YARA performance notes, tips, and hacks.
Here at InQuest, YARA is among the many tools we use to perform deep-file inspection, with a fairly extensive rule set. InQuest operates at line speed in very high-traffic networks, so these rules need to be fast. This blog post is the first in a series discussing YARA performance notes, tips, and hacks.
On February 1st, Adobe published bulletin APSA18-01 for CVE-2018-4878 describing a use-after-free (UAF) vulnerability affecting Flash versions 184.108.40.206 and earlier. As of February 6th, Adobe has patched the issue in version 220.127.116.11, APSB18-03. This post provides an overview of the vulnerability, a walk-through of the exploit seen in the wild, and covers several detection mechanisms.
On October 9th 2017, SensePost researchers posted a technique demonstrating macro-less command execution in Microsoft Office documents through Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE). While variations of this technique are known, the post sheds light on the fact that Microsoft has no intent to address the matter, and that "exploit" creation is trivial. This post provides an overview of the vulnerability, provides a mitigation, covers sample hunting, and covers the dissection of a few interesting samples gathered during the week.