Mobile devices as an espionage tool.
Email-borne pathogens frequently commence with the inclusion of a malicious document. This long-running trend continues to pose a serious threat to the security of organizations and users. Criminals are constantly improving their methods and looking for new ways to compromise victims. Payload trends change over time, with Ransomware being one that is capturing many headlines.
A few days ago, we found an interesting document in the wild that aims to download spyware applications. The sample in question shows low detection rates across multiple antivirus engines, which rouses our suspicion. The email containing the attachment document was allegedly sent from a logistics campaign.
A few days ago, someone uploaded an interesting OLE file to VirusTotal. It abuses the Kaspersky brand, and it is written in Russian and English language. Unfortunately, the original document uses a coercive lure, and the macros contain logic to download weaponized artifacts.
It's no secret that today, targeted attacks and phishing attacks are the primary means of spreading malware. The purpose of which is to collect user data, theft banking data, and espionage. Threat Actors are constantly working to improve the tools they use. In this article, I will try to show you how the Hanictor group is improving their toolbox.
What we all need now and again is some exciting news, and since we have some, we wanted to make an article to share it! Earlier this month, our friends at Abuse.ch officially announced in a tweet that their MalwareBazaar project has integrated with InQuest’s Deep File Inspection (DFI) analysis stack.
In this blog, we dissect a novel and stealthy Excel Macrosheet fueled malware campaign that currently bypasses most protection stacks to deliver ZLoader to its victims. We trace the earliest appearance to Monday, May 4th (Star Wars Day), and continue to actively track this evolving campaign.
In this post, we provide a detailed analysis of an interesting Excel 4.0 XLM macrosheet maldoc distribution campaign that is tied to a variety of executable payloads, a subject matter we'll be covering in a future blog. As of the time of writing, detection rates for this class of attack are relatively low, and these samples happily bypass the internal GSuite and O365 protection mechanisms.
Our CTO, Pedram Amini, and colleague Ero Carrera have open-sourced all the materials from a two-day reverse engineering class they taught over the years at BlackHat, the last instance being at Blackhat 2009 Federal. Written in LaTeX + Beamer, the course materials can be rendered in both slideshow (PDF) and article (PDF) modes. Additionally, the courseware includes malware samples and all requisite references, scripts, tools, exercises, and solutions.
Introduction In this blog, we discuss Adobe Extensible Metadata Platform (XMP) identifiers (IDs) and how they can be used as both pivot and detection anchors. Defined as a standard for mapping graphical asset relationships, XMP allows for tracking of both parent-child relationships and individual revisions. There are three categories of identifiers: original document, document, and instance.
InQuest has just released a new analysis suite for the researcher and hobbyist. Welcome to InQuest Labs! Our CTO, Pedram Amini, presented Worm Charming: Harvesting Malware Lures for Fun and Profit at Blackhat USA 2019. During this talk, Pedram detailed the harvesting mechanism that drives the DFI portion of InQuest Labs. Capable of ingesting malware at scale, samples are fed through a lightweight and less featured version of Deep File Inspection to extract embedded logic, semantic content, metadata, and IOCs such as URLs, domains, IPs, e-mails, and file names.
In this article, we analyze a malicious hta file that we found on VirusTotal. This instance uses a few interesting techniques to evade existing detection mechanisms. In this blog post, we provide an in-depth analysis of this instance and reveal the techniques that are utilized to keep the instance under the radar. At the time of hunting this instance, only two engines marked this instance as malicious.
In this article, we dissect a sophisticated multi-stage PowerShell script that was found on HybridAnalysis a few days back. The discussion entails an in-depth analysis of the various techniques that this particular malware instance utilized to keep itself under the radar. As of writing this article, none of the AntiViruses on VirusTotal detected this sample.
In this article, we dissect a sneaky malicious Microsoft Excel XLM file that we caught in the wild. To do so, we utilize a few open source as well as in-house tools to analyze the Excel document. During our analysis, we point out the limitations of a few popular file carving tools, such as foremost and scalpel, in extracting data from this and related samples.
Inquest uses a variety of machine learning algorithms to model the features of malware that we collect and to gain new insights from such data. Here we travel down the branching rabbit hole of random forests and gradient boosting.
InQuest discovered an open directory hosting several Agent Tesla payloads, as well as several separate web panels for the administration of different Agent Tesla malware campaigns. We decided this was a good time to have a quick look at this malware family, it's capabilities, and the artifacts found in the open directory.
InQuest helps organizations in both threat-hunting and incident response through the use of our RetroHunt capability. RetroHunting allows the searching of a historical data with signatures in order to see if any of the signatures match within that historical file set.
E-mail is a prominent vector for malware delivery, by way of a malicious URL or file attachments. When embedding malicious content within a file, malware authors commonly nest a variety of formats within one another and pivot through numerous stages of payloads before retrieving the final one. In this post, we'll walk through the dissection of a common document malware carrier.
In early April of 2018 we noticed a spike in malicious activity, sourced mostly from the Asias and delivered via SMTP. This post covers our exploration of the campaign and the eventual realization that it is responsible for distributing a mix of garden variety malware, including GandCrab ransomware.
We believe that any security stack, in essence, follows the Swiss cheese model. With each slice of cheese representing a security product, and each hole representing some bypass or evasion. Following best practices and employing a Defense-in-Depth model results in a stacking of these slices, each additional stack reducing the exposure window and minimizing the overall risk to a computing environment.
Modern "fileless" malware campaigns increasingly use specially crafted documents as attack vectors. This allows a malicious file to harbor a payload distinct from executable droppers, and can have its text content easily modified in a phishing campaign without having to alter the nested objects it contains. Deep File Inspection presents a methodology to unwrap these nested files and objects, and classify documents based on their intent; flagging malicious files based on the subsets of functionality they're using.
InQuest provides an on-premises network-focused security solution deployed at many high-volume, mission critical environments, including DISA’s Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS)1. JRSS comprises a regional network security architecture subset for the Joint Information Environment (JIE), administered by DISA 2.
In reviewing the results of our Microsoft Office DDE malware hunt, we came across an interesting lure posing as an Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval letter. The sample utilizes some tricks to increase chances of successful exploitation. We'll walk through the dissection of the components in this post.
On October 9th 2017, SensePost researchers posted a technique demonstrating macro-less command execution in Microsoft Office documents through Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE). While variations of this technique are known, the post sheds light on the fact that Microsoft has no intent to address the matter, and that "exploit" creation is trivial. This post provides an overview of the vulnerability, provides a mitigation, covers sample hunting, and covers the dissection of a few interesting samples gathered during the week.